Arbeitspapier

A Non-cooperative Foundation of Core-Stability in Positive Externality NTU-Coalition Games

We identify the core as an appealing stability concept of cooperative game theory, but argue that the non-cooperative approach has conceptual advantages in the context of economic problems with externalities. Therefore, we derive a non-cooperative foundation of core-stability for positive externality NTU-games. First, in the spirit of Hart/Kurz (1983), we develop a game that we call ?-game and show that strong Nash equilibria coalition structures in this game are identical to ?- and ?-core stable coalition structures. Second, as a by-product of the definition of the ?-game, we develop an extension called an ?-game. Finally, we compare equilibria in the ?- and ?-game with those in the ?- and ?-game of Hart and Kurz (1983).

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: Nota di Lavoro ; No. 31.2003

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Noncooperative Games
Thema
Core-stability
non-cooperative game theory
positive externality games
Transferierbarer Nutzen
Core
Koalition
Externer Effekt
Theorie
Nichtkooperatives Spiel

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Finus, Michael
Rundshagen, Bianca
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM)
(wo)
Milano
(wann)
2003

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:41 MEZ

Datenpartner

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ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Finus, Michael
  • Rundshagen, Bianca
  • Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM)

Entstanden

  • 2003

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