Arbeitspapier
A Non-cooperative Foundation of Core-Stability in Positive Externality NTU-Coalition Games
We identify the core as an appealing stability concept of cooperative game theory, but argue that the non-cooperative approach has conceptual advantages in the context of economic problems with externalities. Therefore, we derive a non-cooperative foundation of core-stability for positive externality NTU-games. First, in the spirit of Hart/Kurz (1983), we develop a game that we call ?-game and show that strong Nash equilibria coalition structures in this game are identical to ?- and ?-core stable coalition structures. Second, as a by-product of the definition of the ?-game, we develop an extension called an ?-game. Finally, we compare equilibria in the ?- and ?-game with those in the ?- and ?-game of Hart and Kurz (1983).
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: Nota di Lavoro ; No. 31.2003
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Noncooperative Games
- Thema
-
Core-stability
non-cooperative game theory
positive externality games
Transferierbarer Nutzen
Core
Koalition
Externer Effekt
Theorie
Nichtkooperatives Spiel
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Finus, Michael
Rundshagen, Bianca
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
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Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM)
- (wo)
-
Milano
- (wann)
-
2003
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:41 MEZ
Datenpartner
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Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Finus, Michael
- Rundshagen, Bianca
- Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM)
Entstanden
- 2003