Arbeitspapier
Cooperative games: Core and shapley value
This article describes the basic elements of the cooperative approach to game theory, one of the two counterparts of the discipline. After the presentation of some basic definitions, the focus will be on the core and the Shapley value, two of the most central solution concepts in cooperative game theory.
- Language
-
Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
-
Series: Working Paper ; No. 2007-11
- Classification
-
Wirtschaft
- Subject
-
game theory
cooperative game
characteristic function
solution concept
core
Shapley value
axiomatics
equivalence principle
non-cooperative implementation
Core
Shapley-Wert
Kooperatives Spiel
Theorie
- Event
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
-
Serrano, Roberto
- Event
-
Veröffentlichung
- (who)
-
Brown University, Department of Economics
- (where)
-
Providence, RI
- (when)
-
2007
- Handle
- Last update
- 10.03.2025, 11:43 AM CET
Data provider
This object is provided by:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Serrano, Roberto
- Brown University, Department of Economics
Time of origin
- 2007
Other Objects (12)
Shapley value: from cooperative game to explainable artificial intelligence
Two-step Shapley-solidarity value for cooperative games with coalition structure
The Shapley Value, Proper Shapley Value, and Sharing Rules for Cooperative Ventures
The Shapley Value and Games with Hierarchies
The Shapley value for shortest path games
On the Shapley value of liability games
Axiomatic characterizations of the core and the Shapley value of the broadcasting game
The Shapley Value for Airport and Irrigation Games
Shapley value cooperative game theory-based locational marginal price computation for loss and emission reduction
On Axiomatizations of the Shapley Value for Assignment Games
The Shapley-value compared to solutions of cooperative n-person games in extensive form and to aspirations
A Minimal Test for Convex Games and the Shapley Value
Shapley value: from cooperative game to explainable artificial intelligence
Two-step Shapley-solidarity value for cooperative games with coalition structure
The Shapley Value, Proper Shapley Value, and Sharing Rules for Cooperative Ventures
The Shapley Value and Games with Hierarchies
The Shapley value for shortest path games
On the Shapley value of liability games
Axiomatic characterizations of the core and the Shapley value of the broadcasting game
The Shapley Value for Airport and Irrigation Games
Shapley value cooperative game theory-based locational marginal price computation for loss and emission reduction
On Axiomatizations of the Shapley Value for Assignment Games
The Shapley-value compared to solutions of cooperative n-person games in extensive form and to aspirations
A Minimal Test for Convex Games and the Shapley Value
Shapley value: from cooperative game to explainable artificial intelligence
Two-step Shapley-solidarity value for cooperative games with coalition structure
The Shapley Value, Proper Shapley Value, and Sharing Rules for Cooperative Ventures
The Shapley Value and Games with Hierarchies
The Shapley value for shortest path games
On the Shapley value of liability games
Axiomatic characterizations of the core and the Shapley value of the broadcasting game
The Shapley Value for Airport and Irrigation Games
Shapley value cooperative game theory-based locational marginal price computation for loss and emission reduction
On Axiomatizations of the Shapley Value for Assignment Games
The Shapley-value compared to solutions of cooperative n-person games in extensive form and to aspirations