Arbeitspapier
Structural robustness of large games
This short survey discusses recent findings on the robustness of Nash equilibria of strategic games with many semianonymous players. It describes the notion of structural robustness and its general consequences, as well as implications to particular games, such as ones played on the web and market games.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: Discussion Paper ; No. 1431
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
- Thema
-
Spieltheorie
Nash-Gleichgewicht
Theorie
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Kalai, Ehud
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Northwestern University, Kellogg School of Management, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science
- (wo)
-
Evanston, IL
- (wann)
-
2006
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ
Datenpartner
Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Kalai, Ehud
- Northwestern University, Kellogg School of Management, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science
Entstanden
- 2006
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