Arbeitspapier
Cores of combined games
This paper studies the core of combined games, obtained by summing two coalitional games. It is shown that the set of balanced transferable utility games can be partitioned into equivalence classes of component games to determine whether the core of the combined game coincides with the sum of the cores of its components. On the other hand, for non-balanced games, the binary relation associating two component games whose combination has an empty core is not transitive. However, we identify a class of non-balanced games which, combined with any other non-balanced game, has an empty core.
- Sprache
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Englisch
- Erschienen in
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Series: Working Paper ; No. 2009-1
- Klassifikation
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Wirtschaft
Game Theory and Bargaining Theory: General
Cooperative Games
- Thema
-
Cooperative Games
Core
Additivity
Issue Linkage
Multi Issue Bargaining
Kooperatives Spiel
Core
Koalition
Verhandlungstheorie
Theorie
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Bloch, Francis
De Clippel, Geoffroy
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
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Brown University, Department of Economics
- (wo)
-
Providence, RI
- (wann)
-
2008
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ
Datenpartner
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Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Bloch, Francis
- De Clippel, Geoffroy
- Brown University, Department of Economics
Entstanden
- 2008