Arbeitspapier

Cores of combined games

This paper studies the core of combined games, obtained by summing two coalitional games. It is shown that the set of balanced transferable utility games can be partitioned into equivalence classes of component games to determine whether the core of the combined game coincides with the sum of the cores of its components. On the other hand, for non-balanced games, the binary relation associating two component games whose combination has an empty core is not transitive. However, we identify a class of non-balanced games which, combined with any other non-balanced game, has an empty core.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: Working Paper ; No. 2009-1

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Game Theory and Bargaining Theory: General
Cooperative Games
Thema
Cooperative Games
Core
Additivity
Issue Linkage
Multi Issue Bargaining
Kooperatives Spiel
Core
Koalition
Verhandlungstheorie
Theorie

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Bloch, Francis
De Clippel, Geoffroy
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Brown University, Department of Economics
(wo)
Providence, RI
(wann)
2008

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ

Datenpartner

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Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Bloch, Francis
  • De Clippel, Geoffroy
  • Brown University, Department of Economics

Entstanden

  • 2008

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