On the Core of Directed Acyclic Graph Games

Arbeitspapier

There lies a network structure between fixed tree and minimum cost spanning tree networks that has not been previously analyzed from a cooperative game theoretic perspective, namely, directed acyclic graph (DAG) networks. In this paper we consider the cost allocation game defined on DAG-networks. We briefly discuss the relation of DAG-games with other network-based cost games. We demonstrate that in general a DAG-game is not concave, even its core might be empty, but we provide an efficiently verifiable condition satisfied by a large class of directed acyclic graphs that is sufficient for balancedness of the associated DAG-game. We introduce a network canonization process and prove various structural results for the core of canonized DAG-games. In particular, we characterize classes of coalitions that have a constant payoff in the core. In addition, we identify a subset of the coalitions that is sufficient to determine the core.

Angaben zum Objekt

• ISBN: 978-615-5447-33-4
• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Series: IEHAS Discussion Papers ; No. MT-DP - 2014/18

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft ; Cooperative Games
• Thema: cooperative game theory ; directed acyclic graphs ; core ; acyclic directed Steiner tree

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Sziklai, Balázs ; Solymosi, Tamás ; Fleiner, Tamás
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): Hungarian Academy of Sciences, Institute of Economics, Centre for Economic and Regional Studies
• (wo): Budapest
• (wann): 2014

Weitere Informationen

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/108335
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ