Arbeitspapier
Core stability and core-like solutions for three-sided assignment games
In this paper, we study different notions of stability for three-sided assignment games. Since the core may be empty in this case, we first focus on other notions of stability such as the notions of subsolution and von Neumann-Morgenstern stable sets. The dominant diagonal property is necessary for the core to be a stable set, and also sufficient in the case where each sector of the market has two agents. Furthermore, for any three-sided assignment market, we prove that the union of the extended cores of all μ-compatible subgames, for a given optimal matching μ, is the core with respect to those allocations that are compatible with that matching, and this union is always non-empty.
- Language
-
Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
-
Series: IEHAS Discussion Papers ; No. MT-DP - 2018/6
- Classification
-
Wirtschaft
Cooperative Games
Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
- Subject
-
Assignment game
core
subsolution
von Neumann-Morgenstern stable set
- Event
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
-
Atay, Ata
Núñez, Marina
- Event
-
Veröffentlichung
- (who)
-
Hungarian Academy of Sciences, Institute of Economics
- (where)
-
Budapest
- (when)
-
2018
- Handle
- Last update
-
10.03.2025, 11:47 AM CET
Data provider
This object is provided by:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Atay, Ata
- Núñez, Marina
- Hungarian Academy of Sciences, Institute of Economics
Time of origin
- 2018
Other Objects (12)
On core stability and extendability
On core stability and extendability
Core stability and core selection in a decentralized labor matching market
Characterizing core stability with fuzzy games
On core stability and apportionment methods
Characterizing core stability with fuzzy games
On core stability and apportionment methods
One-sided communication on a non-cache-coherent many-core architecture
Covered bonds, core markets, and financial stability
Core-stability over networks with widespread externalities
Covered bonds, core markets, and financial stability
Lexicographic allocations and extreme core payoffs: the case of assignment games
On core stability and extendability
On core stability and extendability
Core stability and core selection in a decentralized labor matching market
Characterizing core stability with fuzzy games
On core stability and apportionment methods
Characterizing core stability with fuzzy games
On core stability and apportionment methods
One-sided communication on a non-cache-coherent many-core architecture
Covered bonds, core markets, and financial stability
Core-stability over networks with widespread externalities
Covered bonds, core markets, and financial stability
Lexicographic allocations and extreme core payoffs: the case of assignment games
On core stability and extendability
On core stability and extendability
Core stability and core selection in a decentralized labor matching market
Characterizing core stability with fuzzy games
On core stability and apportionment methods
Characterizing core stability with fuzzy games
On core stability and apportionment methods
One-sided communication on a non-cache-coherent many-core architecture
Covered bonds, core markets, and financial stability
Core-stability over networks with widespread externalities
Covered bonds, core markets, and financial stability