Arbeitspapier
Core stability and core-like solutions for three-sided assignment games
In this paper, we study different notions of stability for three-sided assignment games. Since the core may be empty in this case, we first focus on other notions of stability such as the notions of subsolution and von Neumann-Morgenstern stable sets. The dominant diagonal property is necessary for the core to be a stable set, and also sufficient in the case where each sector of the market has two agents. Furthermore, for any three-sided assignment market, we prove that the union of the extended cores of all μ-compatible subgames, for a given optimal matching μ, is the core with respect to those allocations that are compatible with that matching, and this union is always non-empty.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: IEHAS Discussion Papers ; No. MT-DP - 2018/6
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Cooperative Games
Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
- Thema
-
Assignment game
core
subsolution
von Neumann-Morgenstern stable set
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Atay, Ata
Núñez, Marina
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Hungarian Academy of Sciences, Institute of Economics
- (wo)
-
Budapest
- (wann)
-
2018
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:47 MEZ
Datenpartner
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Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Atay, Ata
- Núñez, Marina
- Hungarian Academy of Sciences, Institute of Economics
Entstanden
- 2018
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