Arbeitspapier
On the nonemptiness of approximate cores of large games
We provide a new proof of the non-emptiness of approximate cores of games with many players of a finite number of types. Earlier papers in the literature proceed by showing that, for games with many players, equal-treatment cores of their "balanced cover games", which are non-empty, can be approximated by equal-treatment e-cores of the games themselves. Our proof is novel in that we rely on a fixed point theorem.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: Working Paper ; No. 726
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Cooperative Games
Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
- Thema
-
NTU games
Core
Approximate cores
Small group effectiveness
Coalition formation
Payoff dependent balancedness
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Allouch, Nizar
Wooders, Myrna
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Queen Mary University of London, School of Economics and Finance
- (wo)
-
London
- (wann)
-
2014
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ
Datenpartner
Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Allouch, Nizar
- Wooders, Myrna
- Queen Mary University of London, School of Economics and Finance
Entstanden
- 2014
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