Arbeitspapier
Approximate Competitive Equilibria in Large Economies
We examine market-clearing prices and allocations in economies where agents' demand functions are undominated relative to their beliefs about other agents' actions. For sufficiently large economies and give certain restrictions on beliefs, the resulting allocations are nearly competitive.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: Discussion Paper ; No. 1101
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Jackson, Matthew O.
Manelli, Alejandro M.
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Northwestern University, Kellogg School of Management, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science
- (wo)
-
Evanston, IL
- (wann)
-
1994
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:41 MEZ
Datenpartner
Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Jackson, Matthew O.
- Manelli, Alejandro M.
- Northwestern University, Kellogg School of Management, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science
Entstanden
- 1994
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