Arbeitspapier
Unaware consumers and disclosure of deficiencies
We analyze firms' incentives to disclose deficiencies of their goods when consumers lack information. We distinguish two types of information: First, only some consumers are aware of the existence of deficiencies, which reduce the quality of the goods. Second, only some consumers have the expertise to infer the true levels of deficiencies once they are aware of the existence of deficiencies. We show that the interplay of awareness and expertise in a market affects firms' incentives to disclose. In particular, we demonstrate that more awareness and/or expertise in a market does not universally lead to more disclosure but depends on the level of competition in the market. Conversely, increasing competition does not always increase firms' incentives to disclose.
- ISBN
-
978-3-943153-99-6
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: BERG Working Paper Series ; No. 178
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
Information and Product Quality; Standardization and Compatibility
- Thema
-
Awareness
Competition
Disclosure
Expertise
Product Quality
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Schmitt, Sefanie Y.
Bruckner, Dominik
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Bamberg University, Bamberg Economic Research Group (BERG)
- (wo)
-
Bamberg
- (wann)
-
2022
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ
Datenpartner
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Schmitt, Sefanie Y.
- Bruckner, Dominik
- Bamberg University, Bamberg Economic Research Group (BERG)
Entstanden
- 2022
Ähnliche Objekte (12)
Online privacy and information disclosure by consumers
Pricing and Information Disclosure in Markets with Loss-Averse Consumers
Mandatory disclosure and financial contagion
Disclosure, transparency, and market discipline
Information Disclosure and Consumer Awareness
Sexual orientation, disclosure and earnings
Inattentive Consumers
Water Tariffs and Consumers' Inaction
Water Tariffs and Consumers' Inaction
Networks, hackers, and nonprotected consumers
Consumers Networks and Search Equilibria
Transparency, disclosure and the federal reserve
Online privacy and information disclosure by consumers
Pricing and Information Disclosure in Markets with Loss-Averse Consumers
Mandatory disclosure and financial contagion
Disclosure, transparency, and market discipline
Information Disclosure and Consumer Awareness
Sexual orientation, disclosure and earnings
Inattentive Consumers
Water Tariffs and Consumers' Inaction
Water Tariffs and Consumers' Inaction
Networks, hackers, and nonprotected consumers
Consumers Networks and Search Equilibria
Transparency, disclosure and the federal reserve
Online privacy and information disclosure by consumers
Pricing and Information Disclosure in Markets with Loss-Averse Consumers
Mandatory disclosure and financial contagion
Disclosure, transparency, and market discipline
Information Disclosure and Consumer Awareness
Sexual orientation, disclosure and earnings
Inattentive Consumers
Water Tariffs and Consumers' Inaction
Water Tariffs and Consumers' Inaction
Networks, hackers, and nonprotected consumers
Consumers Networks and Search Equilibria