Pricing and Information Disclosure in Markets with Loss-Averse Consumers

Arbeitspapier

Abstract: We develop a theory of imperfect competition with loss-averse consumers. All consumers are fully informed about match value and price at the time they make their purchasing decision. However, a share of consumers are initially uncertain about their tastes and form a reference point consisting of an expected match value and an expected price distribution, while other consumers are perfectly informed all the time. We derive pricing implications in duopoly with asymmetric ?rms. In particular, we show that a market may exhibit more price variation the larger the share of uninformed, loss-averse consumers. We also derive implications for ?rm strategy and public policy concerning ?rms' incentives to inform consumers about their match value prior to forming their reference point.

Angaben zum Objekt

• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Series: SFB/TR 15 Discussion Paper ; No. 312

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft
• Thema: Loss Aversion ; Reference-Dependent Utility ; Information Disclosure ; Konsumentenverhalten ; Unvollkommene Information ; Risikoaversion ; Informationsversorgung ; Unvollkommener Wettbewerb ; Preisdifferenzierung ; Preismanagement ; Theorie

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Karle, Heiko ; Peitz, Martin
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): Sonderforschungsbereich/Transregio 15 - Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems (GESY)
• (wo): München
• (wann): 2010

Weitere Informationen

• DOI: doi:10.5282/ubm/epub.13242
• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/94184
• URN: urn:nbn:de:bvb:19-epub-13242-3
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ