Arbeitspapier

De-Targeting: Advertising an Assortment of Products to Loss-Averse Consumers

We consider product markets in which consumers are interested only in a specific product category and initially do not know which product category matches their tastes. Using sophisticated tracking technologies, an intermediary can make inferences about a consumer's preferred product category and offer advertising firms the possibility to target their ads to match the consumer's taste. Such targeting reduces overall advertising costs and, as a direct effect, increases industry profits. However, as we show in this paper, when consumers form reference prices and are loss averse, more precise targeting may intensify competition between firms. As a result, firms may earn higher profits from "de-targeted" advertising; i.e., when the intermediary deliberately informs about some products and their price quotes from outside a consumer's preferred product category.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: Working Paper Series ; No. 16-03

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
Market Structure, Pricing, and Design: Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
Thema
Targeted advertising
Informative advertising
Consumer loss aversion
Reference prices
Contextual inference
Consumer recognition
Behavioral industrial organization

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Karle, Heiko
Peitz, Martin
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
University of Mannheim, Department of Economics
(wo)
Mannheim
(wann)
2016

Handle
URN
urn:nbn:de:bsz:180-madoc-402154
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Karle, Heiko
  • Peitz, Martin
  • University of Mannheim, Department of Economics

Entstanden

  • 2016

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