Arbeitspapier

Transparency, disclosure and the federal reserve

This paper assesses the change in Federal Reserve policy introduced in 1999, with the publication of statements about the outlook for monetary policy (and later about the balance of risks) immediately after each FOMC meeting. We find that markets anticipated monetary policy decisions equally well under this new disclosure regime than before, but arrived at their expectations in different ways. Under the new regime, markets extract information from the statements, whereas before, they needed to revert to other types of Fed communication in the inter-meeting periods, and come to their own assessment of the implications of macroeconomic data releases. Taken together, these findings suggest that the Fed's new disclosure practice may indeed have improved transparency in the sense that information is now released to the markets at an earlier time and with clearer signals, but that the Fed can extract less information from observing market reactions to macroeconomic data releases.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: ECB Working Paper ; No. 457

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Interest Rates: Determination, Term Structure, and Effects
Monetary Policy
Central Banks and Their Policies
Asset Pricing; Trading Volume; Bond Interest Rates
Thema
announcements
communication
disclosure
monetary policy
transparency
Kommunikation
Zentralbank
Schätzung
USA

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Ehrmann, Michael
Fratzscher, Marcel
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
European Central Bank (ECB)
(wo)
Frankfurt a. M.
(wann)
2005

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
20.09.2024, 08:22 MESZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Ehrmann, Michael
  • Fratzscher, Marcel
  • European Central Bank (ECB)

Entstanden

  • 2005

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