Arbeitspapier
Nontransferable Utility Bankruptcy Games
In this paper, we analyze bankruptcy problems with nontransferable utility (NTU) from a game theoretical perspective by redefining corresponding NTU-bankruptcy games in a tailor-made way. It is shown that NTU-bankruptcy games are both coalitional merge convex and ordinal convex. Generalizing the notions of core cover and compromise stability for transferable utility (TU) games to NTU-games, we also show that each NTU-bankruptcy game is compromise stable. Thus, NTU-bankruptcy games are shown to retain the two characterizing properties of TU-bankruptcy games: convexity and compromise stability. As a first example of a game theoretical NTU-bankruptcy rule, we analyze the NTU-adjusted proportional rule and show that this rule corresponds to the compromise value of NTU-bankruptcy games.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper ; No. 14-030/II
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Cooperative Games
- Thema
-
NTU-bankruptcy problem
NTU-bankruptcy game
Coalitional merge convexity
Ordinal convexity
Compromise stability
Core cover
Adjusted proportional rule
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Estévez-Fernández, Arantza
Borm, Peter
Fiestras-Janeiro, M. Gloria
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Tinbergen Institute
- (wo)
-
Amsterdam and Rotterdam
- (wann)
-
2014
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ
Datenpartner
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Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Estévez-Fernández, Arantza
- Borm, Peter
- Fiestras-Janeiro, M. Gloria
- Tinbergen Institute
Entstanden
- 2014
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