Arbeitspapier
Keeping out Trojan Horses: Auctions and Bankruptcy in the Laboratory
If a government auctions the right to market a good, continuity is likely to be of significant importance. In a laboratory experiment, we compare the effects of bidders' limited liability in the first-price sealed-bid auction and the English auction in a common value setting. Our data strongly reject our theoretical prediction that the English auction leads to less aggressive bids and fewer bankruptcies than the first-price sealed-bid auction. X-cursedness gives a robust explanation of our experimental observations, in contrast to risk aversion and asymmetric equilibria.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper ; No. 11-024/1
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Individual
Auctions
Monopolization; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices
- Thema
-
Auctions
Bankruptcy
Laboratory Experiment
Insolvenz
Auktionstheorie
Test
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Onderstal, Sander
van der Veen, Ailko
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Tinbergen Institute
- (wo)
-
Amsterdam and Rotterdam
- (wann)
-
2011
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
- 10.03.2025, 11:45 MEZ
Datenpartner
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Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Onderstal, Sander
- van der Veen, Ailko
- Tinbergen Institute
Entstanden
- 2011