Arbeitspapier

The Balanced Solution for Co-operative Transferable Utility Games

The Shapley value of a cooperative transferable utility game distributes the dividend of each coalition in the game equally among its members. Given exogenous weights for all players, the corresponding weighted Shapley value distributes the dividends proportionally to their weights. In this contribution we define the balanced solution which assigns weights to players such that the corresponding weighted Shapley value of each player is equal to her weight. We prove its existence for all monotone transferable utility games, discuss other properties of this solution, and deal with its characterization through a reduced game consistency.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper ; No. 07-073/1

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Cooperative Games
Thema
Balanced solution
Proportionality
Reduced game consistency
Weighted Shapley value
Shapley-Wert
Kooperatives Spiel
Transferable Utility Games
Theorie

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
van den Brink, René
Levinsky, René
Zeleny, Miroslav
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Tinbergen Institute
(wo)
Amsterdam and Rotterdam
(wann)
2007

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:45 MEZ

Datenpartner

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Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • van den Brink, René
  • Levinsky, René
  • Zeleny, Miroslav
  • Tinbergen Institute

Entstanden

  • 2007

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