Arbeitspapier
The Balanced Solution for Co-operative Transferable Utility Games
The Shapley value of a cooperative transferable utility game distributes the dividend of each coalition in the game equally among its members. Given exogenous weights for all players, the corresponding weighted Shapley value distributes the dividends proportionally to their weights. In this contribution we define the balanced solution which assigns weights to players such that the corresponding weighted Shapley value of each player is equal to her weight. We prove its existence for all monotone transferable utility games, discuss other properties of this solution, and deal with its characterization through a reduced game consistency.
- Language
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Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
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Series: Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper ; No. 07-073/1
- Classification
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Wirtschaft
Cooperative Games
- Subject
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Balanced solution
Proportionality
Reduced game consistency
Weighted Shapley value
Shapley-Wert
Kooperatives Spiel
Transferable Utility Games
Theorie
- Event
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
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van den Brink, René
Levinsky, René
Zeleny, Miroslav
- Event
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Veröffentlichung
- (who)
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Tinbergen Institute
- (where)
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Amsterdam and Rotterdam
- (when)
-
2007
- Handle
- Last update
-
10.03.2025, 11:45 AM CET
Data provider
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ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- van den Brink, René
- Levinsky, René
- Zeleny, Miroslav
- Tinbergen Institute
Time of origin
- 2007
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The Socially Stable Core in Structured Transferable Utility Games
Two Values for Transferable Utility Games with Coalition and Graph Structure
Optimal Incentives without Expected Utility
Balanced Consistency and Balanced Cost Reduction for Sequencing Problems
The Conception of the Individual in Non-Cooperative Game Theory
Efficiency and Collusion Neutrality of Solutions for Cooperative TU-Games
Weighted Temporal Utility
Multi-Player Agents in Cooperative TU-Games
The Harsanyi Set for Cooperative TU-Games
Risk, Balanced Skills and Entrepreneurship
Axiomatizations of a Class of Equal Surplus Sharing Solutions for Cooperative Games with Transferable Utility
The balanced solution for cooperative transferable utility games
The Socially Stable Core in Structured Transferable Utility Games
Two Values for Transferable Utility Games with Coalition and Graph Structure
Optimal Incentives without Expected Utility
Balanced Consistency and Balanced Cost Reduction for Sequencing Problems
The Conception of the Individual in Non-Cooperative Game Theory
Efficiency and Collusion Neutrality of Solutions for Cooperative TU-Games
Weighted Temporal Utility
Multi-Player Agents in Cooperative TU-Games
The Harsanyi Set for Cooperative TU-Games