- Standort
-
Deutsche Nationalbibliothek Frankfurt am Main
- ISSN
-
1434-4750
- Umfang
-
Online-Ressource
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Anmerkungen
-
online resource.
- Erschienen in
-
Revenue comparison of discrete private-value auctions via weak dominance ; volume:21 ; number:4 ; day:7 ; month:7 ; year:2017 ; pages:231-252 ; date:12.2017
Review of economic design ; 21, Heft 4 (7.7.2017), 231-252, 12.2017
- Klassifikation
-
Handel, Kommunikation, Verkehr
- Urheber
- Beteiligte Personen und Organisationen
-
SpringerLink (Online service)
- DOI
-
10.1007/s10058-017-0202-z
- URN
-
urn:nbn:de:1111-2018010611585
- Rechteinformation
-
Der Zugriff auf das Objekt ist unbeschränkt möglich.
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
14.08.2025, 10:44 MESZ
Datenpartner
Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
Deutsche Nationalbibliothek. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Deutsche Nationalbibliothek. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Beteiligte
- Shimoji, Makoto
- SpringerLink (Online service)
Ähnliche Objekte (12)
Iterated weak dominance and interval-dominance supermodular games
Order Independence for Iterated Weak Dominance
Order Independence for Iterated Weak Dominance
Weak versus strong dominance of shrinkage estimators
Efficient and Dominance Solvable Auctions with Interdependent Valuations
Affiliation, equilibrium existence and revenue ranking of auctions
Item pricing for revenue maximization in combinatorial auctions
Lottery versus All-Pay Auction Contests: A Revenue Dominance Theorem
Lottery versus All-Pay Auction Contests – A Revenue Dominance Theorem
Lottery versus All-Pay Auction Contests – A Revenue Dominance Theorem
Discrete dynamics perturbed by weak noise
Revenue comparisons for auctions when bidders have arbitrary types
Iterated weak dominance and interval-dominance supermodular games
Order Independence for Iterated Weak Dominance
Order Independence for Iterated Weak Dominance
Weak versus strong dominance of shrinkage estimators
Efficient and Dominance Solvable Auctions with Interdependent Valuations
Affiliation, equilibrium existence and revenue ranking of auctions
Item pricing for revenue maximization in combinatorial auctions
Lottery versus All-Pay Auction Contests: A Revenue Dominance Theorem
Lottery versus All-Pay Auction Contests – A Revenue Dominance Theorem
Lottery versus All-Pay Auction Contests – A Revenue Dominance Theorem
Discrete dynamics perturbed by weak noise
Revenue comparisons for auctions when bidders have arbitrary types
Iterated weak dominance and interval-dominance supermodular games
Order Independence for Iterated Weak Dominance
Order Independence for Iterated Weak Dominance
Weak versus strong dominance of shrinkage estimators
Efficient and Dominance Solvable Auctions with Interdependent Valuations
Affiliation, equilibrium existence and revenue ranking of auctions
Item pricing for revenue maximization in combinatorial auctions
Lottery versus All-Pay Auction Contests: A Revenue Dominance Theorem
Lottery versus All-Pay Auction Contests – A Revenue Dominance Theorem
Lottery versus All-Pay Auction Contests – A Revenue Dominance Theorem
Discrete dynamics perturbed by weak noise