Affiliation, equilibrium existence and revenue ranking of auctions

Arbeitspapier

Affiliation has been a prominent assumption in the study of economic models with statistical dependence. Despite its large number of applications, especially in auction theory, affiliation has limitations that are important to be aware of. This paper shows that affiliation is a restrictive condition and the intuition usually given for its adoption may be misleading. Also, other usual justifications for affiliation are not compelling. Moreover, some implications of affiliation - namely, equilibrium existence in first-price auctions and the revenue dominance of second-price auctions - do not generalize to other definitions of positive dependence.

Angaben zum Objekt

• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Series: Discussion Paper ; No. 1530

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft ; Existence and Stability Conditions of Equilibrium ; Noncooperative Games ; Auctions ; Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
• Thema: affiliation ; positive dependence ; statistical dependence of types ; conditional independence ; de Finetti's theorem ; minimally informative random variable ; auctions ; pure strategy equilibrium ; revenue ranking

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): De Castro, Luciano I.
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): Northwestern University, Kellogg School of Management, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science
• (wo): Evanston, IL
• (wann): 2010

Weitere Informationen

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/59657
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ