Artikel
Revenue comparisons for auctions when bidders have arbitrary types
This paper develops a methodology for characterizing expected revenue from auctions when bidders' types come from an arbitrary distribution. In particular, types may be multidimensional, and there may be mass points in the distribution. One application extends existing revenue equivalence results. Another application shows that first-price auctions yield higher expected revenue than second-price auctions when bidders are risk averse and face financial constraints. This revenue ranking extends to risk-averse bidders with general forms of non-expected utility preferences.
- Sprache
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Englisch
- Erschienen in
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Journal: Theoretical Economics ; ISSN: 1555-7561 ; Volume: 1 ; Year: 2006 ; Issue: 1 ; Pages: 95-118 ; New York, NY: The Econometric Society
- Klassifikation
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Wirtschaft
Game Theory and Bargaining Theory: General
Auctions
- Thema
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Auctions
multidimensional types and atoms
risk aversion
Gateaux differentiable preferences
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
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Che, Yeon-Koo
Gale, Ian
- Ereignis
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Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
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The Econometric Society
- (wo)
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New York, NY
- (wann)
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2006
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
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10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ
Datenpartner
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Objekttyp
- Artikel
Beteiligte
- Che, Yeon-Koo
- Gale, Ian
- The Econometric Society
Entstanden
- 2006
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