Revenue comparisons for auctions when bidders have arbitrary types

Artikel

This paper develops a methodology for characterizing expected revenue from auctions when bidders' types come from an arbitrary distribution. In particular, types may be multidimensional, and there may be mass points in the distribution. One application extends existing revenue equivalence results. Another application shows that first-price auctions yield higher expected revenue than second-price auctions when bidders are risk averse and face financial constraints. This revenue ranking extends to risk-averse bidders with general forms of non-expected utility preferences.

Angaben zum Objekt

• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Journal: Theoretical Economics ; ISSN: 1555-7561 ; Volume: 1 ; Year: 2006 ; Issue: 1 ; Pages: 95-118 ; New York, NY: The Econometric Society

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft ; Game Theory and Bargaining Theory: General ; Auctions
• Thema: Auctions ; multidimensional types and atoms ; risk aversion ; Gateaux differentiable preferences

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Che, Yeon-Koo ; Gale, Ian
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): The Econometric Society
• (wo): New York, NY
• (wann): 2006

Weitere Informationen

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/150075
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ