Auctions when Bidders Prepare by Investing in Ideas

Arbeitspapier

We consider auction games where, prior to the auction, bidders spend resources to increase their valuations. The market game is solved by solving an equivalent auxiliary social choice problem. We show that standard auctions are fully efficient, whereas reserve price requirements entail a double inefficiency. Moreover, we explain how optimal auctions differ from the well-known static optimum, and sketch the impact of information spillovers.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 258

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft
• Subject: Auctions ; procurement

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Jeitschko, Thomas D. ; Wolfstetter, Elmar G.
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
• (where): Munich
• (when): 2000

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/75504
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:43 AM CET