Arbeitspapier
Auctions when bidders prepare by investing in ideas
We consider auction games where, prior to the auction, bidders spend resources to increase their valuations. The market game is solved by solving an equivalent auxiliary social choice problem. We show that standard auctions are fully efficient, whereas reserve price requirements entail a double inefficiency. Moreover, we explain how optimal auctions differ from the well-known static optimum, and sketch the impact of information spillovers.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: SFB 373 Discussion Paper ; No. 2000,18
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Auctions
- Thema
-
auctions
procurement
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Jeitschko, Thomas D.
Wolfstetter, Elmar
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Humboldt University of Berlin, Interdisciplinary Research Project 373: Quantification and Simulation of Economic Processes
- (wo)
-
Berlin
- (wann)
-
1999
- Handle
- URN
-
urn:nbn:de:kobv:11-10047229
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:45 MEZ
Datenpartner
Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
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ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Jeitschko, Thomas D.
- Wolfstetter, Elmar
- Humboldt University of Berlin, Interdisciplinary Research Project 373: Quantification and Simulation of Economic Processes
Entstanden
- 1999
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