The Impact of Resale on 2-Bidder First-Price Auctions where One Bidder?s Value is Commonly Known

Arbeitspapier

We consider 2-bidder first-price auctions where one bidder's value is commonly known. Such auctions induce an ineffcient allocation. We show that a resale opportunity, where the auction winner can make a take-it-or-leave-it offer to the loser, increases (reduces) the ineffciency of the market when the buyer with the commonly known value is weak (strong). Resale always reduces all bidders' payoffs and increases the initial seller's revenue.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: Bonn Econ Discussion Papers ; No. 25/2004

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Auctions
• Subject: asymmetric first-price auctions ; resale ; efficiency

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Tröger, Thomas
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): University of Bonn, Bonn Graduate School of Economics (BGSE)
• (where): Bonn
• (when): 2004

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/22902
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:44 AM CET