Artikel
Iterated weak dominance and interval-dominance supermodular games
This paper extends Milgrom and Robert's treatment of supermodular games in two ways. It points out that their main characterization result holds under a weaker assumption. It refines the arguments to provide bounds on the set of strategies that survive iterated deletion of weakly dominated strategies. I derive the bounds by iterating the best-response correspondence. I give conditions under which they are independent of the order of deletion of dominated strategies. The results have implications for equilibrium selection and dynamic stability in games.
- Sprache
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Englisch
- Erschienen in
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Journal: Theoretical Economics ; ISSN: 1555-7561 ; Volume: 14 ; Year: 2019 ; Issue: 1 ; Pages: 71-102 ; New Haven, CT: The Econometric Society
- Klassifikation
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Wirtschaft
Noncooperative Games
Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty
- Thema
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Supermodularity
dominance
equilibrium selection
- Ereignis
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Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
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Sobel, Joel
- Ereignis
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Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
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The Econometric Society
- (wo)
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New Haven, CT
- (wann)
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2019
- DOI
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doi:10.3982/TE2904
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
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10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ
Datenpartner
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Objekttyp
- Artikel
Beteiligte
- Sobel, Joel
- The Econometric Society
Entstanden
- 2019