Arbeitspapier

Order Independence for Iterated Weak Dominance

In general, the result of the elimination of weakly dominated strategies depends on order. We find a condition, satisfied by the normal form of any generic extensive form, and by some important games which do not admit generic extensive forms, under which any two games resulting from the elimination of weakly dominated strategies (subject to no more eliminations being possible) are equivalent. We also extend our condition and result to the case of elimination by mixed strategies. The result strengthens the intuitive connection between backward induction and weak dominance. And, under our condition, some computational problems relating to weak dominance, which are gnerally complex, become simple.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: Discussion Paper ; No. 1040

Classification
Wirtschaft

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
McFarland-Marx, Leslie
Swinkels, Jeroen M.
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Northwestern University, Kellogg School of Management, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science
(where)
Evanston, IL
(when)
1993

Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:42 AM CET

Data provider

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Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • McFarland-Marx, Leslie
  • Swinkels, Jeroen M.
  • Northwestern University, Kellogg School of Management, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science

Time of origin

  • 1993

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