Arbeitspapier
Differentiation and performance: An empirical investigation on the incentive effects of bonus plans
It is often claimed that supervisors do not differentiate enough between high and low performing employees when evaluating performance. The purpose of this paper is to study the incentive effects of this behavior empirically. We first show in a simple model that the perceived degree of past differentiation affects future incentives. We then study the impact of differentiation empirically with a large panel data set spanning many firms in one industry. On average, stronger differentiation has a substantial positive effect on performance. This effect is larger on higher hierarchical levels. But differentiation may become harmful at the lowest levels.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: IZA Discussion Papers ; No. 6070
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Personnel Economics: Compensation and Compensation Methods and Their Effects
Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights
- Thema
-
bonus payments
differentiation
subjective performance evaluation
incentives
Leistungsentgelt
Lohnstruktur
Ökonomischer Anreiz
Arbeitsleistung
Theorie
Schätzung
Finanzsektor
Deutschland
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Kampkötter, Patrick
Sliwka, Dirk
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)
- (wo)
-
Bonn
- (wann)
-
2011
- Handle
- URN
-
urn:nbn:de:101:1-201111072844
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ
Datenpartner
Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Kampkötter, Patrick
- Sliwka, Dirk
- Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)
Entstanden
- 2011
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