Arbeitspapier

Bonus payments and reference point violations

We investigate how bonus payments affect satisfaction and performance of managers in a large, multinational company. We find that falling behind a naturally occurring reference point for bonus comparisons reduces satisfaction and subsequent performance. The effects tend to be mitigated if information about one's relative standing towards the reference point is withheld.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: IZA Discussion Papers ; No. 4795

Classification
Wirtschaft
Personnel Economics: Compensation and Compensation Methods and Their Effects
Subject
Reference points
incentives
bonus payments
job satisfaction
job performance

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Ockenfels, Axel
Sliwka, Dirk
Werner, Peter
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)
(where)
Bonn
(when)
2010

Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:44 AM CET

Data provider

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Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Ockenfels, Axel
  • Sliwka, Dirk
  • Werner, Peter
  • Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)

Time of origin

  • 2010

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