Arbeitspapier
Bonus payments and reference point violations
We investigate how bonus payments affect satisfaction and performance of managers in a large, multinational company. We find that falling behind a naturally occurring reference point for bonus comparisons reduces satisfaction and subsequent performance. The effects tend to be mitigated if information about one's relative standing towards the reference point is withheld.
- Language
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Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
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Series: IZA Discussion Papers ; No. 4795
- Classification
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Wirtschaft
Personnel Economics: Compensation and Compensation Methods and Their Effects
- Subject
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Reference points
incentives
bonus payments
job satisfaction
job performance
- Event
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Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
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Ockenfels, Axel
Sliwka, Dirk
Werner, Peter
- Event
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Veröffentlichung
- (who)
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Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)
- (where)
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Bonn
- (when)
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2010
- Handle
- Last update
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10.03.2025, 11:44 AM CET
Data provider
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Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Ockenfels, Axel
- Sliwka, Dirk
- Werner, Peter
- Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)
Time of origin
- 2010