Arbeitspapier

Multi-Rater Performance Evaluations and Incentives

We compare evaluations of employee performance by individuals and groups of supervisors, analyzing a formal model and running a laboratory experiment. The model predicts that multi-rater evaluations are more precise than single-rater evaluations if groups rationally aggregate their signals about employee performance. Our controlled laboratory experiment confirms this prediction and finds evidence that this can indeed be attributed to accurate information processing in the group. Moreover, when employee compensation depends on evaluations, multi-rater evaluations tend to be associated with higher performance.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: IZA Discussion Papers ; No. 16812

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Compensation Packages; Payment Methods
Personnel Economics: Compensation and Compensation Methods and Their Effects
Thema
performance appraisal
calibration panels
group decision-making
real effort
incentives

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Ockenfels, Axel
Sliwka, Dirk
Werner, Peter
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)
(wo)
Bonn
(wann)
2024

Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Ockenfels, Axel
  • Sliwka, Dirk
  • Werner, Peter
  • Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)

Entstanden

  • 2024

Ähnliche Objekte (12)