Arbeitspapier
Multi-Rater Performance Evaluations and Incentives
We compare evaluations of employee performance by individuals and groups of supervisors, analyzing a formal model and running a laboratory experiment. The model predicts that multi-rater evaluations are more precise than single-rater evaluations if groups rationally aggregate their signals about employee performance. Our controlled laboratory experiment confirms this prediction and finds evidence that this can indeed be attributed to accurate information processing in the group. Moreover, when employee compensation depends on evaluations, multi-rater evaluations tend to be associated with higher performance.
- Sprache
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Englisch
- Erschienen in
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Series: IZA Discussion Papers ; No. 16812
- Klassifikation
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Wirtschaft
Compensation Packages; Payment Methods
Personnel Economics: Compensation and Compensation Methods and Their Effects
- Thema
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performance appraisal
calibration panels
group decision-making
real effort
incentives
- Ereignis
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Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
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Ockenfels, Axel
Sliwka, Dirk
Werner, Peter
- Ereignis
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Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
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Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)
- (wo)
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Bonn
- (wann)
-
2024
- Letzte Aktualisierung
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10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ
Datenpartner
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Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Ockenfels, Axel
- Sliwka, Dirk
- Werner, Peter
- Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)
Entstanden
- 2024