Arbeitspapier
The targeted assignment of incentive schemes
A central question in designing optimal policies concerns the assignment of individuals with different observable characteristics to different treatments. We study this question in the context of increasing workers' performance by using targeted incentives based on measurable worker characteristics. To do so, we ran two large-scale experiments. The key results are that (i) performance can be predicted by accurately measured personality traits, (ii) a machine learning algorithm can detect such heterogeneity in worker responses to different schemes, and (iii) a targeted assignment of schemes to individual workers increases performance in a second experiment significantly above the level achieved by the single best scheme.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: ECONtribute Discussion Paper ; No. 187
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
- Thema
-
Randomized Controlled Trial
Incentives
Heterogeneity
Treatment Effects
Selection
Algorithm
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Opitz, Saskia
Sliwka, Dirk
Vogelsang, Timo
Zimmermann, Tom
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
University of Bonn and University of Cologne, Reinhard Selten Institute (RSI)
- (wo)
-
Bonn and Cologne
- (wann)
-
2022
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
- 10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ
Datenpartner
Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Opitz, Saskia
- Sliwka, Dirk
- Vogelsang, Timo
- Zimmermann, Tom
- University of Bonn and University of Cologne, Reinhard Selten Institute (RSI)
Entstanden
- 2022
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