Arbeitspapier
In?nitely Repeated Games with Public Monitoring and Monetary Transfers
In this paper, we study in?nitely repeated games with imperfect public monitoring and the possibility of monetary transfers. We develop an effcient algorithm to compute the set of pure strategy public perfect equilibrium payoffs for each discount factor. We also show how all equilibrium payoffs can be implemented with a simple class of stationary equilibria that use stick-and-carrot punishments.
- Language
-
Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
-
Series: SFB/TR 15 Discussion Paper ; No. 332
- Classification
-
Wirtschaft
- Subject
-
Wiederholte Spiele
Gleichgewicht
Kontrolle
Geld
Theorie
- Event
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
-
Goldluecke, Susanne
Kranz, Sebastian
- Event
-
Veröffentlichung
- (who)
-
Sonderforschungsbereich/Transregio 15 - Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems (GESY)
- (where)
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München
- (when)
-
2010
- DOI
-
doi:10.5282/ubm/epub.13222
- Handle
- URN
-
urn:nbn:de:bvb:19-epub-13222-2
- Last update
-
10.03.2025, 11:42 AM CET
Data provider
This object is provided by:
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ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Goldluecke, Susanne
- Kranz, Sebastian
- Sonderforschungsbereich/Transregio 15 - Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems (GESY)
Time of origin
- 2010
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