Coordination failure in repeated games with almost-public monitoring

Artikel

Some private-monitoring games, that is, games with no public histories, can have histories that are almost public. These games are the natural result of perturbing public monitoring games towards private monitoring. We explore the extent to which it is possible to coordinate continuation play in such games. It is always possible to coordinate continuation play by requiring behavior to have bounded recall (i.e., there is a bound L such that in any period, the last L signals are sufficient to determine behavior). We show that, in games with general almost-public private monitoring, this is essentially the only behavior that can coordinate continuation play.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Journal: Theoretical Economics ; ISSN: 1555-7561 ; Volume: 1 ; Year: 2006 ; Issue: 3 ; Pages: 311-340 ; New York, NY: The Econometric Society

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Noncooperative Games ; Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games; Repeated Games ; Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
• Subject: Repeated games ; private monitoring ; almost-public monitoring ; coordination ; bounded recall

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Mailath, George J. ; Morris, Stephen
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): The Econometric Society
• (where): New York, NY
• (when): 2006

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/150082
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:43 AM CET