Bayesian Repeated Games and Reputations

Arbeitspapier

Under appropriate assumptions (private values and uniform punishments), the Nash equilibria of a Bayesian repeated game without discounting are payoff-equivalent to tractable, completely revealing, equilibria and can be achieved as interim cooperative solutions of the initial Bayesian game. This characterization does not apply to discounted games with patient players. In a class of public good games, the set of Nash equilibrium payoffs of the undiscounted game can be empty, while limit (perfect Bayesian) Nash equilibrium payoffs of the discounted game, as players become infinitely patient, do exist. These equilibria share some features with the ones of multi-sided reputation models.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 4700

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games; Repeated Games ; Noncooperative Games ; Cooperative Games ; Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design ; Public Goods
• Subject: Bayesian game ; incentive compatibility ; individual rationality ; infinitely repeated game ; private values ; public good ; reputation

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Forges, Francoise ; Salomon, Antoine
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
• (where): Munich
• (when): 2014

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/96851
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:42 AM CET