Social Games: Matching and the Play of Finitely Repeated Games

Arbeitspapier

We examine a new class of games, which we call social games, where players not only choose strategies but also choose with whom they play. A group of players who are dissatisfied with the play of their current partners can join together and play a new equilibrium. This imposes new refinements on equilibrium play, where play depends on the relative populations of players in different roles, among other things. We also examine finite repetitions of games where players may choose to rematch in any period. Some equilibria of fixed-player repeated games cannot be sustained as equilibria in a repeated social game. Conversely, the set of repeated matching (or social) equilibria also includes some plays that are not part of any subgame perfect equilibrium of the corresponding fixed-player repeated games. We explore existence under different equilibrium definitions, as well as the relationship to renegotiation-proof equilibrium. It is possible for repeated matching equilibria to be completely distinct from renegotiation-proof equilibria, and even to be Pareto inefficient.

Angaben zum Objekt

• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Series: Nota di Lavoro ; No. 38.2005

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft ; Sociology of Economics ; Cooperative Games ; Noncooperative Games ; Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory ; Labor Contracts
• Thema: Social games ; Matching ; Games ; Repeated games ; Renegotiation ; Wiederholte Spiele ; Matching ; Theorie

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Jackson, Matthew O. ; Watts, Alison
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM)
• (wo): Milano
• (wann): 2005

Weitere Informationen

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/74003
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ