Arbeitspapier

Symmetric play in repeated allocation games

We study symmetric play in a class of repeated games when players are patient. We show that, while the use of symmetric strategy profiles essentially does not restrict the set of feasible payoffs, the set of equilibrium payoffs is an interesting proper subset of the feasible and individually rational set. We also provide a theory of how rational individuals play these games, identifying particular strategies as focal through the considerations of Pareto optimality and simplicity. We report experiments that support many aspects of this theory.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: Discussion Paper ; No. 1551

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Thema
symmetry
repeated games
focal points
experiments
symmetry
repeated games
focal points
experiments

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Kuzmics, Christoph
Palfrey, Thomas
Rogers, Brian W.
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Northwestern University, Kellogg School of Management, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science
(wo)
Evanston, IL
(wann)
2012

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:45 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Kuzmics, Christoph
  • Palfrey, Thomas
  • Rogers, Brian W.
  • Northwestern University, Kellogg School of Management, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science

Entstanden

  • 2012

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