Arbeitspapier
Symmetric play in repeated allocation games
We study symmetric play in a class of repeated games when players are patient. We show that, while the use of symmetric strategy profiles essentially does not restrict the set of feasible payoffs, the set of equilibrium payoffs is an interesting proper subset of the feasible and individually rational set. We also provide a theory of how rational individuals play these games, identifying particular strategies as focal through the considerations of Pareto optimality and simplicity. We report experiments that support many aspects of this theory.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: Working Papers ; No. 468
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
- Thema
-
symmetry
repeated games
focal points
experiments
Wiederholte Spiele
Allokation
Test
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Kuzmics, Christoph
Palfrey, Thomas
Rogers, Brian W.
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Bielefeld University, Institute of Mathematical Economics (IMW)
- (wo)
-
Bielefeld
- (wann)
-
2012
- Handle
- URN
-
urn:nbn:de:0070-pub-26724939
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ
Datenpartner
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Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Kuzmics, Christoph
- Palfrey, Thomas
- Rogers, Brian W.
- Bielefeld University, Institute of Mathematical Economics (IMW)
Entstanden
- 2012