- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: ISER Discussion Paper ; No. 597
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
- Thema
-
Lernprozess
Unvollkommene Information
Theorie
Wiederholte Spiele
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Nachbar, John H.
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Osaka University, Institute of Social and Economic Research (ISER)
- (wo)
-
Osaka
- (wann)
-
2003
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:45 MEZ
Datenpartner
Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Nachbar, John H.
- Osaka University, Institute of Social and Economic Research (ISER)
Entstanden
- 2003
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