Arbeitspapier

Information and beliefs in a repeated normal-form game

We study beliefs and choices in a repeated normal-form game. In addition to a baseline treatment with common knowledge of the game structure and feedback about choices in the previous period, we run treatments (i) without feedback about previous play, (ii) with no information about the opponent's payoffs and (iii) with random matching. Using Stahl and Wilson's (1995) model of limited strategic reasoning, we classify behavior with regard to its strategic sophistication and consider its development over time. We use belief statements to check for the consistency of subjects' actions with the stated beliefs as well as for the accuracy of their beliefs (relative to the opponent's true choice). In the baseline treatment we observe more sophisticated play as well as more accurate beliefs and more best responses to beliefs over time. We isolate feedback as the main driving force of learning to play strategically and to form beliefs that accurately predict the behavior of the opponent.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: IZA Discussion Papers ; No. 3627

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Noncooperative Games
Thema
Experiments
beliefs
strategic uncertainty
learning
Entscheidung bei Unsicherheit
Erwartungstheorie
Wiederholte Spiele
Lernprozess
Test

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Fehr, Dietmar
Kübler, Dorothea
Danz, David
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)
(wo)
Bonn
(wann)
2008

Handle
URN
urn:nbn:de:101:1-20080820126
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Fehr, Dietmar
  • Kübler, Dorothea
  • Danz, David
  • Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)

Entstanden

  • 2008

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