Using private job agencies: Optimal screening or cream skimming?

Arbeitspapier

In a model with private information of the worker about her ability and unobservable effort choice, the role of public and private employment services is analyzed. The coexistence of an inefficient employment exchange and an efficient private agency may lead to optimal screening with first best contracts. This is due to the assumption that good types of workers lose more human capital than bad types in periods of unemployment or mismatch. A bad type of worker earns an information rent if the employment exchange is inefficient and the employer chooses not to use the private agency.

Angaben zum Objekt

• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Series: SFB 373 Discussion Paper ; No. 1997,53

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft ; Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design ; Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness ; Labor Contracts ; Unemployment: Models, Duration, Incidence, and Job Search
• Thema: principal agent ; screening contracts ; employment services

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Kübler, Dorothea
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): Humboldt University of Berlin, Interdisciplinary Research Project 373: Quantification and Simulation of Economic Processes
• (wo): Berlin
• (wann): 1997

Weitere Informationen

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/66289
• URN: urn:nbn:de:kobv:11-10064334
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 10.03.2025, 11:45 MEZ