Artikel

Dynamic games with (almost) perfect information

This paper aims to solve two fundamental problems on finite or infinite horizon dynamic games with complete information. Under some mild conditions, we prove the existence of subgame-perfect equilibria and the upper hemicontinuity of equilibrium payoffs in general dynamic games with simultaneous moves (i.e., almost perfect information), which go beyond previous works in the sense that stagewise public randomization and the continuity requirement on the state variables are not needed. For alternating move (i.e., perfect-information) dynamic games with uncertainty, we show the existence of pure-strategy subgame-perfect equilibria as well as the upper hemicontinuity of equilibrium payoffs, extending the earlier results on perfect-information deterministic dynamic games.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Journal: Theoretical Economics ; ISSN: 1555-7561 ; Volume: 15 ; Year: 2020 ; Issue: 2 ; Pages: 811-859 ; New Haven, CT: The Econometric Society

Classification
Wirtschaft
Existence and Stability Conditions of Equilibrium
Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games; Repeated Games
Subject
Dynamic games
perfect information
almost perfect information
subgame-perfect equilibrium
atomless transition
atomless reference measure

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
He, Wei
Sun, Yeneng
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
The Econometric Society
(where)
New Haven, CT
(when)
2020

DOI
doi:10.3982/TE2927
Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:42 AM CET

Data provider

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ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.

Object type

  • Artikel

Associated

  • He, Wei
  • Sun, Yeneng
  • The Econometric Society

Time of origin

  • 2020

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