Artikel

Efficiency in repeated games with local interaction and uncertain local monitoring

The paper discusses community enforcement in infinitely repeated, two-action games with local interaction and uncertain monitoring. Each player interacts with and observes only a fixed set of opponents, of whom he is privately informed. The main result shows that when beliefs about the monitoring structure have full support, efficiency can be sustained with sequential equilibria that are independent of the players' beliefs. Stronger results are obtained when only acyclic monitoring structures are allowed or players have unit discount rates. These equilibria satisfy numerous robustness properties.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Journal: Theoretical Economics ; ISSN: 1555-7561 ; Volume: 9 ; Year: 2014 ; Issue: 1 ; Pages: 279-312 ; New Haven, CT: The Econometric Society

Classification
Wirtschaft
Noncooperative Games
Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games; Repeated Games
Network Formation and Analysis: Theory
Subject
Local monitoring
repeated games
cooperation
networks

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Nava, Francesco
Piccione, Michele
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
The Econometric Society
(where)
New Haven, CT
(when)
2014

DOI
doi:10.3982/TE1200
Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:43 AM CET

Data provider

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Object type

  • Artikel

Associated

  • Nava, Francesco
  • Piccione, Michele
  • The Econometric Society

Time of origin

  • 2014

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