Artikel
Efficiency in repeated games with local interaction and uncertain local monitoring
The paper discusses community enforcement in infinitely repeated, two-action games with local interaction and uncertain monitoring. Each player interacts with and observes only a fixed set of opponents, of whom he is privately informed. The main result shows that when beliefs about the monitoring structure have full support, efficiency can be sustained with sequential equilibria that are independent of the players' beliefs. Stronger results are obtained when only acyclic monitoring structures are allowed or players have unit discount rates. These equilibria satisfy numerous robustness properties.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Journal: Theoretical Economics ; ISSN: 1555-7561 ; Volume: 9 ; Year: 2014 ; Issue: 1 ; Pages: 279-312 ; New Haven, CT: The Econometric Society
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Noncooperative Games
Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games; Repeated Games
Network Formation and Analysis: Theory
- Thema
-
Local monitoring
repeated games
cooperation
networks
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Nava, Francesco
Piccione, Michele
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
The Econometric Society
- (wo)
-
New Haven, CT
- (wann)
-
2014
- DOI
-
doi:10.3982/TE1200
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ
Datenpartner
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Objekttyp
- Artikel
Beteiligte
- Nava, Francesco
- Piccione, Michele
- The Econometric Society
Entstanden
- 2014
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