Artikel
Local stability under evolutionary game dynamics
We prove that any regular ESS is asymptotically stable under any impartial pairwise comparison dynamic, including the Smith dynamic; under any separable excess payoff dynamic, including the BNN dynamic; and under the best response dynamic. Combined with existing results for imitative dynamics, our analysis validates the use of ESS as a blanket sufficient condition for local stability under evolutionary game dynamics.
- Language
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Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
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Journal: Theoretical Economics ; ISSN: 1555-7561 ; Volume: 5 ; Year: 2010 ; Issue: 1 ; Pages: 27-50 ; New Haven, CT: The Econometric Society
- Classification
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Wirtschaft
Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games; Repeated Games
- Subject
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Evolutionary game dynamics
ESS
- Event
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Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
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Sandholm, William H.
- Event
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Veröffentlichung
- (who)
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The Econometric Society
- (where)
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New Haven, CT
- (when)
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2010
- DOI
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doi:10.3982/TE505
- Handle
- Last update
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10.03.2025, 11:41 AM CET
Data provider
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ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Artikel
Associated
- Sandholm, William H.
- The Econometric Society
Time of origin
- 2010
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2008,11 : Generalized projection dynamics in evolutionary game theory
Package ‘EvolutionaryGames’
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