Arbeitspapier
Imperfect information, on-the-job training, and the employer size-wage puzzle: Theory and evidence
This paper develops a two-period labor market model with imperfect information and on-the-job training, and uses data from National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1979 Cohorts (NLSY79) to test its predictions. We find that training does not explain the positive relationship between employer size and wage. In addition, for industries that display size-wage premium, workers in large establishments are more likely to receive on-the-job training but their return to training is smaller. Our theory, substantiated by the new empirical evidence, suggests that it is not large firms, per se, but firms that hire better workers who are paying a wage premium.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: IZA Discussion Papers ; No. 4998
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
Wage Level and Structure; Wage Differentials
- Thema
-
Imperfect information
sorting
on-the-job training
size-wage premium
Lohnniveau
Betriebsgröße
Berufsbegleitende Ausbildung
Bildungsertrag
Unvollkommene Information
Arbeitsmarkt
Schätzung
USA
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Feng, Shuaizhang
Zheng, Bingyong
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)
- (wo)
-
Bonn
- (wann)
-
2010
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:41 MEZ
Datenpartner
Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Feng, Shuaizhang
- Zheng, Bingyong
- Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)
Entstanden
- 2010
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