Arbeitspapier

Minimum Wages and On-the-Job Training

Becker?s theory of human capital predicts that minimum wages should reduce training investments for affected workers because they prevent these workers from taking wage cuts necessary to finance training. In contrast, in noncompetitive labor markets, minimum wages tend to increase training of affected workers because they induce firms to train their unskilled employees. We provide new estimates on the impact of the state and federal increases in the minimum wage between 1987 and 1992 on the training of low wage workers. We find no evidence that minimum wages reduce training, and little evidence that they tend to increase training. We therefore develop a hybrid model where minimum wages reduce the training investments of workers who were taking wage cuts to finance their training, while increasing the training of other workers. Finally, we provide some evidence consistent with this hybrid model.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: IZA Discussion Papers ; No. 384

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Wage Level and Structure; Wage Differentials
Labor Contracts
Human Capital; Skills; Occupational Choice; Labor Productivity
Thema
Imperfect labor markets
low wage workers
general human capital
firm sponsored training
Mindestlohn
Berufsbegleitende Ausbildung
Humankapital
Theorie
Schätzung
USA

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Acemoglu, Daron
Pischke, Jörn-Steffen
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)
(wo)
Bonn
(wann)
2001

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Acemoglu, Daron
  • Pischke, Jörn-Steffen
  • Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)

Entstanden

  • 2001

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