Arbeitspapier

On-the-Job Search and Sorting

This paper characterizes the equilibrium for a large class of search models with two-sided heterogeneity and on-the-job search. Besides the well-known congestion externalities, we show that on-the-job search in combination with monopsonistic wage setting without commitment creates a business-stealing externality. In the absence of congestion effects, this leads to excessive vacancy creation. Under wage setting with commitment this externality is absent because when posting a wage, firms take into account the expected productivity of future workers in their current jobs. If firms are able to make and respond to counteroffers, then they will not have to pay no-quit premia and this also leads to excessive vacancy creation.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper ; No. 05-070/3

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Employment; Unemployment; Wages; Intergenerational Income Distribution; Aggregate Human Capital; Aggregate Labor Productivity
Labor Force and Employment, Size, and Structure
Labor Demand
Thema
assignment
on-the job search
wage bargaining
sorting
Suchtheorie
Tarifverhandlungen
Lohnstruktur
Theorie

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Gautier, Pieter A.
Teulings, Coen N.
van Vuuren, Aico
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Tinbergen Institute
(wo)
Amsterdam and Rotterdam
(wann)
2005

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ

Datenpartner

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Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Gautier, Pieter A.
  • Teulings, Coen N.
  • van Vuuren, Aico
  • Tinbergen Institute

Entstanden

  • 2005

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