Arbeitspapier

Imperfect Decision-Making and the Tax Payer Puzzle

Even if the expected punishment on tax evasion is negligible, empirical studies show that actual tax evasion is smaller than rational choice models predict. In addition to this, tax payer do not respond on parameter changes as predicted. Some authors tried to explain this puzzle by assuming "tax morale". Our paper models tax payers as imperfect decision-makers and explains deviations from the optimal solution by making use of a weaker assumption: The imperfect tax payer's decision to deviate from a given rule depends on their competence and on the complexity of their situation.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: CSLE Discussion Paper ; No. 97-01

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Tax Evasion and Avoidance
Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law
Thema
tax compliance
bounded rationality
imperfect decision-making
detection skill
rule-governed behavior

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Schmidtchen, Dieter
Kirstein, Roland
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Universität des Saarlandes, Center for the Study of Law and Economics (CSLE)
(wo)
Saarbrücken
(wann)
1997

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:41 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Schmidtchen, Dieter
  • Kirstein, Roland
  • Universität des Saarlandes, Center for the Study of Law and Economics (CSLE)

Entstanden

  • 1997

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