Arbeitspapier
Imperfect Decision-Making and the Tax Payer Puzzle
Even if the expected punishment on tax evasion is negligible, empirical studies show that actual tax evasion is smaller than rational choice models predict. In addition to this, tax payer do not respond on parameter changes as predicted. Some authors tried to explain this puzzle by assuming "tax morale". Our paper models tax payers as imperfect decision-makers and explains deviations from the optimal solution by making use of a weaker assumption: The imperfect tax payer's decision to deviate from a given rule depends on their competence and on the complexity of their situation.
- Language
-
Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
-
Series: CSLE Discussion Paper ; No. 97-01
- Classification
-
Wirtschaft
Tax Evasion and Avoidance
Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law
- Subject
-
tax compliance
bounded rationality
imperfect decision-making
detection skill
rule-governed behavior
- Event
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
-
Schmidtchen, Dieter
Kirstein, Roland
- Event
-
Veröffentlichung
- (who)
-
Universität des Saarlandes, Center for the Study of Law and Economics (CSLE)
- (where)
-
Saarbrücken
- (when)
-
1997
- Handle
- Last update
-
10.03.2025, 11:41 AM CET
Data provider
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ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Schmidtchen, Dieter
- Kirstein, Roland
- Universität des Saarlandes, Center for the Study of Law and Economics (CSLE)
Time of origin
- 1997
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