Cartel pricing dynamics with cost variability and endogenous buyer detection

Arbeitspapier

This paper characterizes collusive pricing patterns when buyers may detect the presence of a cartel. Buyers are assumed to become suspicious when observed prices are anomalous. We find that the cartel price path is comprised of two phases. During the transitional phase, price is generally rising and relatively unresponsive to cost shocks. During the stationary phase, price responds to cost but is much less sensitive than under non-collusion or simple monopoly. The length of the transition phase is decreasing in the variance of cost shocks. It is also shown that the cartel price path may overshoot its long-run level so that price converges from above.

Angaben zum Objekt

• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Series: Working Paper ; No. 514

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft
• Thema: Kartell ; Preisabsprache ; Theorie

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Harrington, Joseph E. ; Chen, Joe
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): The Johns Hopkins University, Department of Economics
• (wo): Baltimore, MD
• (wann): 2004

Weitere Informationen

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/72013
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ