Arbeitspapier
Endogenous Cartel Formation with Heterogeneous Firms
In the context of an infinitely repeated capacity-constrained price game, we endogenize the composition of a cartel when .rms are heterogeneous in their capacities. When .rms are sufficiently patient, there exists a stable cartel involving the largest .rms. A .rm with sufficiently small capacity is not a member of any stable cartel. When a cartel is not all-inclusive, colluding firms set a price that serves as an umbrella with non-cartel members pricing below it and producing at capacity. Contrary to previous work, our results suggest that the most severe coordinated e¡èects may come from mergers involving moderate-sized firms, rather than the largest or smallest firms.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: Working Paper ; No. 544
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
- Thema
-
Collusion
Cartel Size
Kartell
Betriebliche Preispolitik
Preisführer
Theorie
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Bos, Iwan
Harrington, Joseph E.
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
The Johns Hopkins University, Department of Economics
- (wo)
-
Baltimore, MD
- (wann)
-
2008
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ
Datenpartner
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Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Bos, Iwan
- Harrington, Joseph E.
- The Johns Hopkins University, Department of Economics
Entstanden
- 2008
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