Endogenous cartel formation: Experimental evidence

Arbeitspapier

In a Bertrand-oligopoly experiment, firms choose whether or not to engage in cartel-like communication and, if so, they may get fined by a cartel authority. We find that four-firm industries form cartels more often than duopolies because they gain less from a hysteresis effect after cartel disruption.

Object Details

• ISBN: 978-3-86304-158-8
• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: DICE Discussion Paper ; No. 159

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Monopolization; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices
• Subject: cartels ; collusion ; communication ; experiments ; repeated games

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Fonseca, Miguel A. ; Normann, Hans-Theo
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): Heinrich Heine University Düsseldorf, Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE)
• (where): Düsseldorf
• (when): 2014

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/101325
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:42 AM CET