Arbeitspapier
The effects of private damage claims on cartel activity: Experimental evidence
Private damage claims against cartels may have negative effects on leniency: whereas whistleblowers obtain full immunity regarding the public cartel fines, they have no or only restricted protection against private third-party damage claims. This may stabilize cartels. We run an experiment to study this issue. Firms choose whether to join a cartel, may apply for leniency afterwards, and then potentially face private damages. We find that the implementation of private damage claims reduces cartel formation but makes cartels indeed more stable. The negative effect of damages is avoided in a novel setting where the whistleblower is also protected from damages.
- ISBN
-
978-3-86304-597-5
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: DICE Discussion Paper ; No. 315
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Design of Experiments: General
Monopolization; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices
Antitrust Policy and Public Enterprises, Nonprofit Institutions, and Professional Organizations
- Thema
-
Private damage claims
cartel stability
laboratory experiment
leniency
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Bodnar, Olivia
Fremerey, Melinda
Normann, Hans-Theo
Schad, Jannika Leonie
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Heinrich Heine University Düsseldorf, Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE)
- (wo)
-
Düsseldorf
- (wann)
-
2021
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ
Datenpartner
Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Bodnar, Olivia
- Fremerey, Melinda
- Normann, Hans-Theo
- Schad, Jannika Leonie
- Heinrich Heine University Düsseldorf, Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE)
Entstanden
- 2021
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