Cartel stability in experimental auctions

Arbeitspapier

Using laboratory experiments, we compare the stability of bidding rings in the English auction and the first-price sealed-bid auction in a heterogeneous-value setting. In both a re-matching condition and a fixed-matching condition, we observe that biddings rings are more stable in the English auction than in the first-price sealed-bid auction. In both conditions, the first-price sealed-bid auction dominates the English auction in terms of average revenue and the revenue spread. The English auction outperforms the first-price sealed-bid auction in terms of efficiency.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper ; No. TI 2019-009/VII

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Group Behavior ; Auctions ; Monopolization; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices
• Subject: Cartel stability ; English auction ; First-price sealed-bid auction ; Laboratory experiments

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Hinloopen, Jeroen ; Onderstal, Sander ; Treuren, Leonard
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): Tinbergen Institute
• (where): Amsterdam and Rotterdam
• (when): 2019

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/205299
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:45 AM CET